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First Financial Bank v. Lane, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 96 (Dec. 24, 2014)1
PROPERTY: RECOVERY RIGHTS OF SUCCESSOR LIENHOLDER
Summary
The Court determined whether the definition of “indebtedness,” found in NRS 40.451, in
conjunction with NRS 40.459, limits the amount a successor lienholder can recover in a
deficiency judgment.
Disposition
NRS 40.451 does not set a consideration-based limit which a successor lienholder can
recover in a deficiency judgment action to the amount of consideration paid by the lienholder to
obtain the note and deed of trust.
Factual and Procedural History
Respondents Gordon and Carol Lane took out a three million dollar loan for the purchase
of a commercial real estate property. Respondent John Serpa executed a personal guarantee on
the Lane’s loan. The Lanes subsequently defaulted on the loan, and Serpa did not fulfill the
obligations of his personal guarantee.
Before the original lender foreclosed on the property, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation was appointed the loan’s receiver, and it assigned the interest to appellant First
National Bank, N.A. (hereinafter FFB) for $2,256,879.90.2 FFB foreclosed and sold the property
at auction, to itself, for $1,890,000.00. The property’s fair market value at the time of auction
was $2,300,000.00.
After selling the property, FFB brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guarantee
against respondents. The district court entered final judgment for respondents “under NRS
40.451 because the fair market value of the subject property [$2,300,000.00] exceeds the
consideration [FFB] paid [the FDIC] to acquire a lien on the property [$2,256,879].” FFB
appealed.
Discussion
The district court decided this case based on its interpretation of NRS 40.451. NRS
40.451 delineates the categories of debt that may be collected under a deficiency judgment,
defining an obligor’s indebtedness subject to collection:
[First Sentence:] As used in [the deficiency judgment statutes]
"indebtedness" means the principal balance of the obligation
secured by a mortgage or other lien on real property, together with
all interest accrued and unpaid prior to the time of foreclosure sale,
all costs and fees of such a sale, all advances made with respect to
the property by the beneficiary, and all other amounts secured by
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By Joseph Meissner.
$2,256,879.90 represented 75% of the then-due balance on the loan of $3,009,166.66.

the mortgage or other lien on the real property in favor of the
person seeking the deficiency judgment. [Limitation:] Such
amount constituting a lien is limited to the amount of the
consideration paid by the lienholder.
The first sentence of NRS 40.451 represents five categories of obligation, that together,
constitute an obligor’s “indebtedness” enforceable by a deficiency judgment following
foreclosure.
At issue is the effect of NRS 40.451’s second, limiting sentence on each of the five
categories of debt described in the first sentence: “[s]uch amount constituting a lien is limited to
the amount of the consideration paid by the lienholder.”3
A.
Respondents first asserted that the limiting sentence applies to each of the five categories,
instead of just the final, fifth category delineated in NRS 40.451. The Court disagreed, finding
that the opening phrase “[s]uch amount” suggests that the limiting sentence only “applies to the
last antecedent,”4 meaning the limitation is only effectual against the fifth category, or “all other
amounts secured by the mortgage or other lien,”5 rather than each of the five categories. In
addition, the Court examined the statute’s legislative history and found that in its original, 1969
version, the term “lien” only appeared in the fifth category. The term was added to the first
category in 1989 to accomplish a grammatical correction to existing law, not to alter or
reinterpret the original legislative intent behind the statute.
The Court found the meaning and application of NRS 40.451’s limitation to be plain, and
the intended result to be uncomplicated. The limiting sentence affects the fifth category of
indebtedness only, and it limits the measure of deficiency recovery to the actual amount of
consideration exchanged between a lender and borrower to create said lien.
B.
Next, respondents relied on the 2011 enactment of NRS 40.459(1)(c). NRS 40.459(1)(c)
directs that where a person seeking a deficiency judgment “acquired the right to obtain the
judgment from a person who previously held that right,”6 the judgment may not exceed “the
amount by which the amount of the consideration paid for that right exceeds the fair market
value of the property sold at the time of sale of the amount for which the property was actually
sold.”7 Respondents argued that the phrase “consideration paid” could also refer to the
consideration paid by a third-party secondary purchaser to obtain assignment of the debt, thereby
limiting an element of that successor-in-interest’s indebtedness to the amount paid to acquire the
assignment of debt.8
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The Court disagreed for three reasons. First, NRS 40.451’s text does not mention
successors-in-interest. Further, each category of indebtedness describes an obligation owed by a
borrower to a lender; consideration paid by a successor for the assignment of the original
obligation is irrelevant. Finally, the Court found that to read NRS 40.451 to include successorsin-interest would be to abrogate the common law of most states, something it was not willing to
do with clear legislative instruction to do so.
Second, because NRS 40.459(1)(c) limits the value of the lien to the consideration given
from a successor-in-interest to the mortgagee, the Court found that respondents’ interpretation of
NRS 40.451would make NRS 40.459(1)(c) ineffectual where assignment of rights is at issue.
Additionally, where an assignment is not at issue, NRS 40.451’s limitation would have no effect
because, as respondents interpret the phrase, “consideration paid” by the lienholder would also
be the “principle balance” of the loan.9
Third, and most importantly, the legislative history regarding NRS 40.451 confirmed the
Court’s findings. Throughout the many hearings to which the Legislature subjected then A.B.
493 (Nev. 1969), successors-in-interest to the note and deed of trust were not mentioned, nor any
intent that would alter the common law regarding assignors and assignees. The Court found that
these concerns would have played a central role in the limitation crafted by the Legislature if it
had intended it to apply, and thereby found respondents’ interpretation to be definitively
incorrect.
Conclusion
NRS 40.451 does not set an assignor-assignee, consideration-based limit on FFB’s
recovery against respondents. The limitation only applies to the fifth category of indebtedness,
“all other amounts secured by the mortgage or other lien on the real property in favor of the
person seeking the deficiency judgment,” and limits the amount recoverable under that category
to the consideration extended by the lender to the borrower.
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